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A Morass of Confusion and Inconsistency: The
Application of the Doctrine of Nullum Tempus
Occurrit Regi in North Carolina
THOMAS R. YOUNG*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi has been an acknowl-
edged part of the fabric of North Carolina's jurisprudence since 1834.1
With historic origins that can be traced at least as far back as the sev-
enteenth century,2 the doctrine, which prescribes the application of
statutes of limitations on sovereign bodies, has weathered the torrents
of changing societal attitudes and survives in North Carolina today-
for the most part unscathed and in some respects more robust than
when it was first introduced. This is altogether astonishing when one
considers that in a number of other jurisdictions, the doctrine has
been abolished altogether or significandy abrogated.3
* Thomas "Rob" Young is a staff attorney for the Alexander County Department
of Social Services in Taylorsville, North Carolina. He obtained his undergraduate
degree from the University of North Carolina at Asheville in 1992 and his law degree
from Drake University School of Law in 1995.
1. Armstrong v. Dalton, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 568 (1834). The doctrine is translated
as "time does not run against the king." Id.
2. The precise origins of the nullum tempus doctrine and associated doctrines of
governmental immunity are somewhat clouded. Sir Edward Coke is documented
acknowledging that the doctrine precluded application of statutes of limitation against
the king. See 1 H.C.Jour. (Feb. 13, 1621) 520. The idea continued to have currency in
the latter half of the eighteenth century when the English Crown tried the case of
Russell v. Men of Devon. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Ed., 305 A.2d 877, 878-84 (Pa.
1973) (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.)).
3. Nullum tempus has been abolished in four states: Colorado, Shootman v. Dep't
of Trans., 926 P.2d 1200 (Colo. 1996); New Jersey, NJ. Educ. Facilities Auth. v.
Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559 (NJ. 1991); South Carolina, State ex rel. Condon v. City
of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000); and West Virginia, State ex rel. Smith v.
Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 488 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997). Nullum
tempus has been abrogated in a number of jurisdictions, including: Alabama, State v.
Mudd, 143 So. 2d 171, 174 (Ala. 1962); Delaware, Mayor of Wilmington v. Dukes, 157
A.2d 789, 795 (Del. 1960); Idaho, Bannock County v. Bell, 65 P. 710, 712 (Idaho
1901); Indiana, City of Bedford v. Willard, 33 N.E. 368, 369 (Ind. 1893); Maryland,
Balt. County v. RTKL Assoc., 846 A.2d 433, 444 (Md. 2004); Missouri, In re Estate of
Thomas, 743 S.W.2d 74, 80 (Mo. 1988); Nebraska, State ex rel. Chem. Nat'l Bank v.
Sch. Dist. No. 9, 46 N.W. 613, 615 (Neb. 1890); Rhode Island, Ramsden v. Ford, 143
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While nullum tempus remains a judicially recognized doctrine in
this state, the uniform and consistent application of the doctrine by
the courts has yet to be realized despite 170 years of trying to do so.
This is not a fact unknown to North Carolina's courts, which have at
times candidly admitted that application of the doctrine in one
instance with a given set of facts is no guarantee that another instance
with a similar set of facts will likewise benefit from application of the
doctrine.4 At one point, where the court of appeals seemed poised to
toss aside the doctrine, the tribunal snatched the doctrine from the
jaws of death, setting it free and giving it a new lease on life.5 How-
ever, in so doing, the court failed to annunciate clear principles to
guide application in the future. While the doctrine was validated and
extended to broader application, the blueprint for practical application
continued to develop in the ad hoc fashion that has remained in place
for nearly a century and a half.
Given the courts' and legislature's desire to maintain the doctrine
of nullum tempus, the need for guiding principles of application is
great. This article seeks to piece together the disparate guiding princi-
ples the courts have articulated regarding the nullum tempus doctrine
from its initial introduction in North Carolina to the present time. Sec-
ondarily, the article will explore the case for modification of the cur-
rent interpretation of the doctrine so as to provide a more uniform and
consistent application to governmental actions. In so doing, an inquiry
will be made into the approach other jurisdictions upholding nullum
tempus take toward applying the doctrine. Finally, the article will
explore the implications of abolishing the doctrine altogether, weigh-
ing the competing advantages and disadvantages of disgorging a doc-
trine which has for so long been a component of North Carolina law.
I. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI
The doctrine of nullum tempus was initially developed at common
law as an assertion of the proposition that the king should not suffer
from the negligence of his officers to pursue legal claims:
From the presumption that the King is daily employed in the weighty
and public affairs of government, it has been an established rule of
common law, that no laches shall be imputed to him, nor is he in any
way to suffer in his interests, which are certain and permanent. "Vigi-
A.2d 697, 698-99 (R.I. 1958); and Virginia, Burns v. Bd. of Supervisors, 315 S.E.2d
856, 859 (Va. 1984).
4. Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 213 S.E.2d 297 (N.C. 1975).
5. Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum, 418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992).
[Vol. 28:251
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lantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt"6 is a rule for the subject,
but nullun tempus occurrit regi, is the King's plea.7
This view was also maintained by Blackstone, who considered the doc-
trine to be a component of the Royal Dignity, which the law confers
upon the king in the form of the triple attributes of sovereignty,
perpetuity and absolute perfection.8 Nullum tempus was a manifesta-
tion of absolute perfection, which implied the sovereign was incapable
of doing or thinking wrong, incapable of meaning anything improper,
possessed neither folly nor weakness, could not be corrupt of blood
and could never act in a state of incapacity or minority.9 This Royal
Dignity was a necessary badge of office which distinguished the king
from his subjects and was viewed as being essential to the preservation
of the monarchial form of government. As noted by Blackstone:
The law ascribes to the king, in his high political character, not only
large powers and emoluments which form his prerogative and revenue,
but likewise certain attributes of a great and transcendent nature; by
which the people are led to consider him in a light of a superior being,
and to pay him that awful respect, which may enable him with greater
ease to carry on the business of government.' °
The Royal Dignity, and the immunity of the sovereign which composed
a part of that dignity, was a creation of the common law of England."
As the inheritor of the common law, the United States received various
immunity doctrines including nullum tempus occurrit regi.12 These
immunity doctrines helped form the sovereign dignity of the various
states prior to the ratification of the Constitution.' 3 Following ratifica-
tion, the inherited immunity doctrines were woven into the fabric of
our national Constitution's state sovereignty clauses, finding oblique
expression in both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 14
6. Literally "the law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their
rights." Thungpalan v. Estaquio, G.R. No. 136207, (S.C. June 21, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2 005 /136207.htm.
7. Armstrong v. Dalton, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 568, 569 (1834) (citations omitted).
8. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *232-40.
9. Id. at *240.
10. Id. at *234.
11. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 715.
14. Id.
20061 253
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II. NULLUM TEMPUS DIFFERENTIATED FROM SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Nullum tempus should be differentiated from the analogous doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, rex non potest peccare.15 Both the nullum
tempus and sovereign immunity doctrines have at their core a common
function of providing sanctuary to the sovereign against the missteps
or incompetence of the officers of the state. This commonality has led
some to view nullum tempus as merely a sub-species of sovereign
immunity; quite logically, since both doctrines spring from the con-
cept of absolute sovereign perfection (a component of the Royal Dig-
nity). 16 However, a key difference between the doctrines exists, which
can be explained by reference to the type of public evil each doctrine
attempts to affect. Sovereign immunity provides protection against lia-
bility for tortious actions arising out of the conduct of governmental
workers, while nullum tempus merely provides a safeguard against the
government's failure to take action prior to the onset of a statute of
limitations. Appreciating the distinct nature of the two doctrines is
important because sovereign immunity, with the modern advent of lia-
bility insurance, has not enjoyed the legislative and judicial longevity
enjoyed by nullum tempus. Some jurisdictions have completely abol-
ished the former doctrine while still maintaining, in a more truncated
form, the latter doctrine. 17
15. The phrase translates to "the king cannot sin (or can do no wrong)." E.g.,
Williamson v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 374 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987).
16. See Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, 435 A.2d 796, 801
(Md. 1981). The organic connection between nullum tempus and sovereign immunity
has been considered by some jurisdictions to be the basis for eliminating both
doctrines when sovereign immunity came under attack. See State ex rel. Condon v.
City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000). However, other jurisdictions have
disagreed with this analysis and have viewed the doctrines as distinct. See Evergreen
Park Sch. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 658 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Dep't of Transp. v.J.W.
Bishop & Co., 439 A.2d 101, 104 (Pa. 1981). Despite abolition of sovereign immunity,
the Illinois Supreme Court holds the doctrine of nullum tempus remains viable in that
the doctrine supports the policy of protecting the public from injury and loss due to
the negligence of public officers. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium Inc., 451
N.E.2d 874, 876-78 (Ill. 1983).
17. Jurisdictions that have rejected sovereign immunity while at the same time
retaining the protections afforded by the nullum tempus doctrine include: Illinois,
Shelbyville, 451 N.E.2d 874; Ohio, State Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798
(Ohio 1988); Oklahoma, Okla. City Mun. Improvement Auth. v. HTB Inc., 769 P.2d
131 (Okla. 1988); and Pennsylvania, Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop
& Co., 439 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1981).
[Vol. 28:251
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III. THE HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF NULLUM TEMPUS
IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE PRE-ROWAN HISTORY
North Carolina's recognition of nullum tempus was early and fol-
lowed on the heels of prior recognition by the federal courts.' 8 In Arm-
strong v. Dalton, the North Carolina Supreme Court first took up the
issue in a case involving county efforts to recoup public money from
an estate. 9 The chairman of the Stokes County Court, Thomas J. Arm-
strong, brought an action of assumpsit against Daniel Dalton, who was
executor of the estate of Isaac Dalton.20 By way of deposition that was
read to an empanelled jury, Armstrong was able to establish that Dal-
ton, who prior to his death had been Treasurer of Public Buildings, had
received certain public monies and that those monies had neither been
disbursed nor had there been a proper accounting. 21 "The defendant
[countered with] evidence that . . . more than three years had elapsed
since [the deceased had] made a payment on account of the fund in his
hands" and asserted the defense that the action of the plaintiff was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 2 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion, indicating that county courts acted in a sover-
eign capacity when collecting public monies and that such actions
were immune from the statute of limitations that would ordinarily
apply.23 In reviewing the lower court's decision, the supreme court,
recounting the history of nullum tempus as it had been passed down to
the United States, acknowledged a role for sovereign exemption from
limitation in North Carolina.24 But the court's approval of the doctrine
did not come without severe reservations. First of all, the court pointed
out that a distinction was to be made between statutes of general appli-
cability, which do not specifically place limits on governmental
actions, and those statutes of express applicability, which are careful to
include the sovereign in their scope.25 The doctrine of nullum tempus
fully applied to protect the state against the effects of an adverse stat-
18. See United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373);
Armstrong v. Dalton, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 568 (1834). For a general discussion of the
historic origins of the doctrine, see also United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486
(1879); Bait. County v. RTKL Assoc., 846 A.2d 433 (Md. 2004).
19. Armstrong, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 568.
20. Id. Assumpsit is a common law form of action in equity for breach of a
promise to pay some amount to another person. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 133 (8th ed.
2004).
21. Armstrong, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 568.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 569.
25. Id.
2006] 255
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ute of limitation wherever the language of the statute was general-
where the language did not expressly make the statute applicable to
the sovereign.26 In all other cases, the sovereign was bound in the same
respect as a private citizen to observe the restrictions imposed by the
27statute. Second, the court pointed out that historically nullum
tempus was the sole prerogative of the sovereign state, and the benefits
of the doctrine did not extend to counties or municipalities, even
though these counties and municipalities might be carrying out the
mandates of a statute imposed by the state.2 This point was reinforced
by the court's conclusion that states benefit from nullum tempus
because their actions must always be presumed to be for the good of
the commonwealth, a presumption not necessarily applicable to the
smaller political subdivision. As the court stated:
The King or the State cannot be presumed to mean wrong, or to have
an interest inconsistent with justice. But these communities, like the
individuals who compose them, have no such legal presumption in
their favour. No authority is shown to support the position that they
are not like other corporations or private persons subject to the opera-
tion of the Statutes of Limitations, nor can we see any reason which
can bring them within the exception which is admitted to apply to the
sovereign and the State.29
Over time, the Armstrong court's approach to nullum tempus in
situations where counties and municipalities are treated differently
from the state gave way to a different analysis. Adopted by later
courts, this analysis is based upon a discussion of proprietary-versus-
governmental action, largely abandoning earlier per se restrictions that
denied the benefits of nullum tempus to counties and municipalities.30
The expansion of the doctrine has occurred even though other state
courts have reconsidered the philosophical underpinnings of nullum
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 570-71. In this regard, the Armstrong court was making a distinction
between sovereign immunity as opposed to governmental immunity from applicable
statutes of limitations. Id. The State, not its subdivisions, was the only sovereign body
able to assume the prerogative of exemption from statutes of limitation inherited from
the English Crown. Id.; see also United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1879).
29. Armstrong, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 570-71.
30. See Charlotte v. Kavanaugh, 20 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 1942) (analyzing, for one of the
first times, applicability of the nullum tempus doctrine based upon whether a
governmental purpose exists rather than based solely on whether the entity seeking
relief from a limitation statute is actually a sovereign).
[Vol. 28:251
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tempus and have, in some cases, decided to dispense with the doc-
trine's prohibitions altogether.31
Despite some changes with regard to how immunity from limita-
tion is applied, on the whole North Carolina has preserved the doc-
trine.32 Some restrictions have been placed on the immunity
conferred: Immunity generally exists where a governmental function is
in play, and immunity is cast aside where the action of government is
more proprietary.3 3
Other states have been less generous, abandoning their inherited
doctrines of immunity as they found them to be antiquated or no
longer justified in a modern society.34 North Carolina's continued
affirmation of conferred immunity upon governmental functions,
however, has not been carried out in the most graceful fashion. Defin-
ing what exactly one means when declaring a certain action "govern-
mental" as opposed to "proprietary" has not come easily, leading to
what one commentator has termed "a morass of confusion and incon-
sistency.' '35 Perhaps as a result of this concern, the doctrine's popular-
31. Many examples exist where the doctrine of governmental immunity and
specifically immunity from statutory limitation has been abrogated to varying degrees.
Some states, North Carolina being a leading example, have chosen to preserve such
doctrines, but have continued to place restrictions on the applicability of immunity.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-30 (2005); accord Oroz v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155
(Wyo. 1978) (holding that when confined to the legislative and judicial functions of
the government, governmental liability is the rule and immunity is the exception).
Other states have chosen to abandon the doctrines of immunity altogether. See
Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (holding municipal entities liable
for wrongful actions of police officers); Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa.
1973); see also sources cited supra notes 3, 17.
32. Reference is made to the treatment of governmental immunity in general even
though this article confines itself to nullum tempus immunity.
33. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-30 (2005). By way of explanation, it should be stated
that this statute was passed after judicial acceptance of the doctrine and was initially
interpreted as making the same statutory limitations applicable to private parties
equally applicable to governmental actions, thus abrogating the common law doctrine
of nullum tempus. This judicial interpretation no longer holds true. Compare Furman v.
Timberlake, 93 N.C. 66 (1885) (abrogating nullum tempus), with Rowan County Bd. of
Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 418 S.E.2d 648, 653 (N.C. 1992) (declining to abrogate
nullum tempus).
34. See Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (holding municipal
entities liable for the wrongful actions of police officers); Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Educ.,
305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973).
35. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS 626 (8th ed. 1988). The North Carolina
courts have noted the difficulty of sorting out governmental from proprietary
undertakings by governments. In Pulliam v. City of Greensboro, the court outlined a
brief history of the difficulty which has resulted in illogical distinctions and
7
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ity had decreased significantly by the middle of the twentieth century,
maintaining its only robust expression in governmental taxation
cases.
36
IV. THE RE-AFFIRMATION OF NULLUM TEMPUS: ROWAN COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION V. U.S. GYPSUM Co.
The general trend in North Carolina up to 1992 was to restrict
governmental immunity without eliminating the doctrine altogether. 7
It was therefore very surprising when this trend was reversed in the
case of Rowan County Board of Education v. U.S. Gypsum Co., a case
where the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the continued vital-
ity of nullum tempus in a school board suit concerning asbestos
removal.38 The court stated, "We now clarify the status of this doc-
trine in this jurisdiction: nullum tempus survives in North Carolina
and applies to exempt the State and its political subdivisions from the
running of time limitations unless the pertinent statute expressly
includes the State." 3
9
In Rowan, the Rowan County School Board brought suit against
U.S. Gypsum to recover costs associated with the removal of asbestos-
containing ceiling plasters from several county schools.40 Defendant
U.S. Gypsum moved for summary judgment, alleging the plaintiff's
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 41 The trial
court granted the motion, which was then appealed by Rowan County.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
to trial.42 A key component of the appellate court's rationale was that
the doctrine of nullum tempus precludes application of statutes of limi-
tation to governmental subdivisions of the state when the subdivision
classification of activities in a less than scientific manner. 407 S.E.2d 567, 568-69
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
36. See, e.g., Guilford County v. Hampton, 32 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. 1945); see also
Charlotte v. Kavanaugh, 20 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 1942); Manning v. Atlantic R.R., 125 S.E.
555 (N.C. 1924); Threadgill v. Wadesboro, 87 S.E. 521 (N.C. 1916).
37. See Guilford County, 32 S.E.2d 606 (recognizing limitation of nullum tempus to
peripheral tax cases as a trend toward restricting the doctrine's use); see also Koontz v.
City of Winston-Salem, 186 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. 1972).
38. Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (Rowan III), 418 S.E.2d 648
(N.C. 1992).
39. Id. at 653.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 651.
42. Id.
[Vol. 28:251258
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is engaged in a governmental purpose.43 At trial, plaintiff Rowan
County was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.44 On
a second appeal U.S. Gypsum argued, among other things, that the
court of appeals had erred by reversing the initial trial court's grant of
summary judgment and remanding the case.45 A divided panel of the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the statute of limita-
tions issue, and U.S. Gypsum appealed to the North Carolina Supreme
Court (Rowan III).46
In affirming the continued validity of nullum tempus, the supreme
court laid to rest concerns about chapter 1, section 30 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, a provision which facially made all statutes
of limitation applicable both to private parties and to the govern-
ment.47 The court in Rowan III held North Carolina's courts had tradi-
tionally interpreted chapter 1, section 30 of the North Carolina
General Statutes to make applicable time limits apply only to suits
which stem from the proprietary acts of government and noted that,
despite invitation by the courts for the legislature to correct this inter-
pretation, the legislature failed to act.48 Thus, according to the Rowan
III court, the traditional interpretation should prevail.
While nullum tempus was affirmed, the court was quick to assert
that the doctrine did not apply in every case in which the state is a
party. Continuing to affirm more recent interpretations of the doc-
trine, the court held:
If the function at issue is governmental, time limitations do not run
against the State or its subdivisions unless the statute at issue
expressly includes the State. If the function is proprietary, time limita-
tions do run against the State and its subdivisions unless the statute at
issue expressly excludes the State.49
While Rowan III accomplished great things in clarifying the status
of nullum tempus, its principal failure was that the holding did not
improve upon the governmental-versus-proprietary dichotomy which
43. Id.; see also Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (Rowan 1), 359
S.E.2d 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
44. Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (Rowan II), 407 S.E.2d 860,
861 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
45. Rowan II, 407 S.E.2d at 862.
46. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 650-52.
47. Id. at 653; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-30 (2005) ("The limitations prescribed by law
apply to civil actions brought in the name of the State, or for its benefit, in the same
manner as to actions by or for the benefit of private parties.").
48. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 653-54. Since 1992, the legislature has done nothing
to change the interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-30.
49. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 654.
2006] 259
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had created so much confusion in the past. Furthermore, the case did
nothing to establish a brightline rule for identifying which classifica-
tion a given governmental activity should receive. Instead, the court
deferred to an empirical analysis of how those jurisdictions retaining
nullum tempus classify school construction within the confines of the
governmental-versus-proprietary dichotomy.5 0
V. THE POST-ROWAN HISTORY
Rowan represents the climax of the doctrinal development of nul-
lum tempus in North Carolina. Since 1992, no significant clarification
has been handed down from the courts to replace or clarify application
of the governmental-versus-proprietary function dichotomy.
Unfortunately, this creates significant hardship for the trial courts
since neither the Rowan court nor its predecessors have painted bright-
lines for the purpose of providing general principles to guide action.
Very few moments of clarity have arisen over time. For instance, prior
to Rowan, the court in Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital, Inc. was
able to pick out a few common characteristics of those cases where the
courts were somewhat consistent in labeling a governmental action
proprietary or purely governmental:
"[A]pplication of [the governmental-proprietary distinction] to given
factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable splits of authority and
confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions
are proprietary." Nonetheless, an analysis of the various activities that
this Court has held to be proprietary in nature reveals that they
involved a monetary charge of some type. While a "charge" has been
involved in each case holding a particular function to be proprietary,
we note that the basis for each holding was not dependent on the
"profit motive.". . . Furthermore, it appears that all of the activities held
to be governmental functions by this Court are those historically per-
formed by the government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by
private corporations.51
Additionally, the supreme court in Rowan followed up on the
observations made in Sides by agreeing that a government function
should only be labeled "governmental" when the function is histori-
50. Id. at 655-57. As it turns out, the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed
the issue of school construction consider the undertaking a purely governmental
function.
51. Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 213 S.E.2d 297, 302-03 (N.C. 1975)
(citations omitted) (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 186 S.E.2d 897, 907
(N.C. 1972)).
260 [Vol. 28:251
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cally a fundamental exercise of governmental power and prerogative."
A proper exercise of a fundamental governmental power, according to
the Rowan court, is one in which the common health, safety, security,
or general welfare of the citizenry is promoted or protected.53
VI. NULLUM TEMPUS TODAY: THE CURRENT PRINCIPLES
FOR JUDICIAL APPLICATION
Notwithstanding the limited clarity of appellate court opinions on
the subject, application of the nullum tempus doctrine in North Caro-
lina can presently be reduced to several guiding principles. First, the
doctrine applies to the political subdivisions of the state as well as to
the state itself.54 Second, a governmental-versus-proprietary dichoto-
mous test determines whether a court should apply the doctrine. Gen-
erally, governmental activities are protected by nullum tempus, while
proprietary activities are not.55 In the process of applying one label
over another, a determination must be made as to whether a substan-
tive, but not necessarily profit-motivated, charge was imposed, for in
such cases the proprietary label almost always applies. 56 A further
determination also needs to be made as to whether the governmental
activity seeking nullum tempus protection is one that is a fundamental
exercise of governmental power; that is, whether the activity seeks pri-
marily to promote the health, safety, and welfare of all citizens.57 If the
activity cannot be broadly cast as being for the common good of all
citizens, then the activity must be classified as proprietary in nature
and therefore not entitled to the protections of nullum tempus. 58
Such general statements, themselves subject to many exceptions, 9
continue to present problems for proper determination of whether a
governmental-versus-proprietary label is appropriate. As mentioned
52. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 654-56. The court specifically noted education was a
fundamental governmental function of the state based upon constitutional and
statutory mandates. Thus the court ultimately held Rowan County acted "as an arm of
the state and pursu[ed] the governmental function of... 'construction and
maintenance' of its schools." Id. at 655.
53. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Asheville, 52 S.E.2d 371, 373 (N.C. 1949)); see also
Vaughn v. County of Durham, 240 S.E.2d 456, 459 (N.C. 1977).
54. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 655.
55. Id. at 654-55.
56. See Sides, 213 S.E.2d at 303.
57. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 655 (citing Rhodes, 52 S.E.2d at 373).
58. Rowan III, 418 S.E.2d at 655.
59. For an overview of North Carolina cases that have outlined exceptions to the
nullum tempus doctrine see 20A STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 4TH, LIMITATIONS,
REPOSE, AND LACHES § 5 (2005).
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before, a number of jurisdictions, when confronted with such
problems, have concluded that the governmental-versus-proprietary
dichotomy is an inappropriate basis for determining whether nullum
tempus should apply.6 ° Unable to find a more suitable alternative,
some jurisdictions have disposed of the doctrine altogether. 61 North
Carolina has retained the doctrine in its more recently expanded form
but has consistently noted the difficulties inherent in determining
whether an activity is governmental or proprietary.62 Having recog-
nized the difficulty, neither the courts nor the legislature have been
willing to set forth a clear method of reducing the difficulties inherent
in classification. Whether this inaction is due to the impossibility of
the task is open to question. Regardless of the reason behind the inac-
tion, the present reality is that the purpose of the doctrine, to shield
governments from statutes of limitations and repose which would
impede the discharge of core activities, is compromised by the piece-
meal and unsatisfactory fashion in which nullum tempus protection is
granted.
VII. NULLUM TEMPUS TODAY: Is THE DOCTRINE
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION?
At first blush, it seems nullum tempus relies too much upon the
seemingly antiquated doctrine of Royal Dignity. For example, while
North Carolina's government shares with English royalty the attributes
of sovereignty and perpetuity, one would be hard pressed today to find
much agreement with the view that the state acts in a manner of abso-
lute perfection. Such skepticism appears very much justified when
one considers the current legal landscape where governmental immu-
nity in every form is willingly abrogated by some states.63 With such
abrogation it must be recognized that North Carolina (like the federal
government and many other states that have enacted tort claims legis-
lation) is impliedly and expressly acknowledging that it deserves to be
held accountable under certain defined circumstances.6 4 If a state
chooses to cast aside the previously impenetrable veil of immunity, a
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Balt. County v. RTKL Assoc., 846 A.2d 433, 444 (Md. 2004) (referring
to the governmental-versus-proprietary analysis as a "mish-mash regime" and refusing
to extend nullum tempus to contract actions).
62. E.g., Evans v. Hous. Auth., 602 S.E.2d 668, 671 (N.C. 2004).
63. See supra notes 3, 31 and accompanying text.
64. See North Carolina Tort Claims Act, N.C. GEN STAT. § 143-291-143-300.1A
(2005).
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strong argument can be made that it should not continue to claim the
benefits and protection of that veil.
For a state to continue to benefit from nullum tempus, the doctrine
needs another justification which can be found in other attributes of
the state, namely the attribute of sovereignty. Regardless of what con-
temporary minds think about the state government's perfection, there
is little question that the state is sovereign over its people. To be sover-
eign, according to Blackstone, is to be pre-eminent, which carries with
it the attributes of being "the supreme head of the realm . . . and of
consequence inferior to no man ... dependent on no man, accounta-
ble to no man .... ,,6 In stating this, Blackstone echoed Bracton, who
had earlier stated that the king has no equal within his realm and is
only subordinate to God and the law.66 Thomas Hobbes attributes
this pre-eminence to the original act of the multitude of a nation who
institute sovereignty by conferring certain "rights and facultyes" which
make the sovereign "singulis majores, of greater Power than every one
of [his] subjects .... 67
This pre-eminence can be the basis for the state asserting immu-
nity from statutes of limitation. Since the government alone is capable
of creating the laws which govern the multitudes, it alone is in a posi-
tion to determine the content of those laws. If the government wishes
to limit its liability and a compelling public policy reason justifies such
limitation, then based on the government's pre-eminence, its status as
singulis majores, it reasonably could be vested with the necessary pre-
rogative to effect such limitation.
This was the justification posited by Justice Holmes early in the twen-
tieth century when he claimed there can be no legal right of suit
against a sovereign, who is the font of all legal rights.68 The United
States Supreme Court, in Alden v. Maine, recently affirmed this view of
the sovereign immunity of the states and also affirmed the existence of
65. WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *241-42.
66. HENRY OF BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 33 (Samuel E.
Thorne ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1268), available at http://
hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton/Unframed/English/v2/33.htm. Bracton also noted that
while the king may be subordinate to the law no writs may run against the king. Id.
67. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (Wash. Sq. Press 1964) (1651).
68. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Justice Holmes,
speaking for the majority on the issue of the rationale for governmental liability at the
turn of the century decidedly distanced himself from traditional explanations couched
in notions of monarchial prerogative when he chose a more contemporary approach.
Id. "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Id.
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the sovereign dignity of each state and the constitutional basis for that
sovereign dignity.69 While some of the original justification for nullum
tempus has eroded with time, the doctrine's rationale nevertheless
remains robustly vital and adequately supported. State sovereignty is
a matter of common law inheritance and constitutional design. Thus,
a state's sole ability to create law within its territorial realm gives it the
prerogative to be free of the effect of the laws it creates.
VIII. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE APPROACH TO NULLUM TEMPUS
APPLICATION: DOES IT FURTHER THE PURPOSE BETTER?
If nullum tempus can be grounded upon the sovereign prerogatives
of the state, a fair question arises as to whether the governmental-ver-
sus-proprietary dichotomy can be clarified by reference to other juris-
dictions' jurisprudence. At one time, nullum tempus was formally
adopted by case law, by statutory enactment, or through constitutional
integration in twenty-two states and the District of Columbia.7" But
there are distinctions between the states with regard to the manner in
which they apply nullum tempus. One notable example is that some
states, such as North Carolina, extend the doctrine to the state and its
political subdivisions while other states, Alabama for instance, confine
application of the doctrine to the state alone. But as has been noted
previously, such a distinction only affects the reach of the doctrine and
has no implication for the governmental-versus-proprietary
determination.
The states of Oklahoma, Arizona, and Tennessee also retain the
doctrine and apply it to actions involving the state as well as its politi-
cal subdivisions. 71 Like North Carolina, these states have resorted to a
dichotomous test to determine applicability of the doctrine, which
imposes a more general application. However, unlike North Carolina's
test for application of nullum tempus, the courts of these states inquire
69. 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
70. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and
Wyoming have recognized the doctrine through their case law. California, the District
of Columbia, Mississippi, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington have
adopted nullum tempus through statutory enactment. The states of Louisiana and
Mississippi have provisions related to the adoption of nullum tempus in their
constitutions. Brady L. Greene, The King Never Dies: The Application of Nullum
Tempus Occurit Regi to Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Cases, 11 CORP. ANALYST
94, 94-95 nn.4-6.
71. Trimble v. Am. Sav. Life Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1131 (Ariz. 1986); Okla. City Mun.
Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131 (Okla. 1988); Hamilton County Bd. of
Educ. v. Asbestospray Corp., 909 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. 1995).
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as to whether a public or a private right is affected rather than as to
whether a given action is governmental or proprietary.72 The test for
determining which label applies is simply whether the right affects the
public generally or only affects a limited class of individuals within the
political subdivision.73 More significantly, Oklahoma confers, as a
matter of public policy, "every reasonable presumption favorable to
governmental immunity from . . . limitations" when determining
whether public or private rights are at issue.7 4 In Tennessee, statutes
of limitation, when applied against actions brought by the government,
"175are "looked upon with disfavor ....
The semantic differentiation along with the public policy inclina-
tion to favor governmental immunity from statutes of limitation pro-
duces a significant clarifying effect. Courts determining whether a
governmental action implicates a public right versus a merely private
right rule heavily in favor of the government, to the point where practi-
cally any governmental entity claiming it is acting in a sovereign capac-
ity, whether or not the entity is actually a sovereign, is afforded
protection for its actions. This pro-government slant certainly clarifies
analysis of whether a statute of limitation applies. The only relevant
question seems to be whether each member of the general public in a
state could benefit by the governmental action in some way, however
circumscribed that benefit may be.
Despite the virtue of added clarity, such a liberal approach to nul-
lum tempus has been criticized for its side effects, such as encouraging
"slothful, dilatory behavior" by those who serve governmental bodies,
since nearly every action can be shielded by the armor of nullum
tempus.76 Further criticism of this approach is that because such
immunity from limitations is so broad-based, applying to the state as
well as to each political subdivision, the citizenry is exposed to the
specter of their government holding eternal claims and remedies
72. See cases cited supra note 71. In Arizona and Oklahoma, the legislatures have
renounced the governmental-versus-proprietary dichotomy. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-
510 (LEXIS through 2005 legislation); cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1 (LEXIS through
2005 Extraordinary Sesssion, Act 1) (speaking to the governmental-versus-proprietary
dichotomy in the context of sovereign immunity).
73. See supra note 71.
74. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Good Twp., 107 P.2d 805, 806 (Okla. 1940).
75. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. v. Asbestospray Corp., 909 S.W.2d 783, 785
(Tenn. 1995).
76. State ex rel. Schones v. Town of Chanute, 858 P.2d 436, 446 (Okla. 1993)
(Opala, J., dissenting).
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which can come to roost long into the future when the ability to defend
against such a claim may no longer exist.7 7
IX. SHOULD NULLUM TEMPUS BE ABANDONED IN NORTH CAROLINA?
In a democracy such as ours, there is a legitimate question
whether North Carolina ought to continue to recognize and apply to its
own actions a prerogative of the state's former king. Where the state
has placed itself on an even playing field with the private citizen in the
area of immunity from lawsuits, so the argument goes, it seems incon-
gruous for the state to assert that in other respects the sovereign is
nonetheless the better man and entitled to preferential treatment.78
From a practical standpoint, critics might further seize upon the dis-
mal history the state has experienced with the dichotomous method of
sorting out governmental-versus-proprietary activities which leaves
much to be desired and does not lead to an even and just application of
the law. Such a state of disarray, it could be argued, cannot be toler-
ated in a state which has placed such emphasis on precedent and con-
sistency in its judicial functions. Accordingly, without a coherent and
justifiable rationale to undergird a principle of law, where the princi-
ple cannot practically be vindicated, there is little reason to sustain the
principle. It should therefore be discarded.
While such a conclusion is an attractive one, it is not without cost.
Inasmuch as state government, counties, and municipalities would be
under the same obligation as the private citizen to make sure their law-
suits are timely, the public welfare suddenly would become dependent
upon the diligence of every governmental employee charged with over-
seeing the public interest. While this interest will certainly be looked
after for the most part, it almost goes without saying that somewhere,
somehow, someone in a place of importance is going to slip up and the
public will be forced to bear the consequences. If the protection of nul-
lum tempus is eliminated, the tax cheats and slipshod construction
firms of the state will most certainly have an extended and indefinite
holiday from liability.
Nevertheless, if one accepts the arguments that: 1) the underlying
rationale is not antiquated but is supported by both common law and
77. See Okla. City Mun. Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131, 141-42
(Okla. 1988) (Opala, J., dissenting).
78. But see Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (Rowan III), 418 S.E.2d
648, 657 (N.C. 1992) ("While limiting sovereign immunity diminishes the
government's escape of its misdeeds, the same concern for the rights of the public
supports retention of nu~ium tempus, as that doctrine allows the government to pursue
wrongdoers in vindication of public rights and the public purse.").
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constitutional principles; and 2) the doctrine of nullum tempus is
undergirded by the concept of state sovereignty and possession of the
rule-making prerogative, then the only issue remaining is to modify
public policy to allow judicial application so as to accomplish the aims
of the doctrine. Shaping public policy to favor a governmental-pur-
pose analysis, broad-based and liberally disposed toward finding a gov-
ernmental purpose, can eliminate the practical problems experienced
in North Carolina over the years in applying the doctrine under the
present dichotomous test.
Again, there are costs to such a modification as well. Any party
who does business with a governmental entity may find itself exposed
to litigation arising from transactions that transpired in the distant
past. Beyond this, there is also the consideration that taking the pres-
sure off governmental employees to be vigilant in the prosecution of
suits encourages a dilatory and slothful habit of mind, clearly not the
perfect model for public servants to follow.
CONCLUSION
While nullum tempus is alive and well in North Carolina today, the
uniform and consistent application of the doctrine has yet to be real-
ized despite an expansion of the doctrine's scope. The critical problem
in recent history has been identifying proper benchmarks for applica-
tion of the governmental-versus-proprietary test, which North Carolina
courts have used to determine the applicability of nullum tempus.
Despite recognizing the difficulty, neither the courts nor the legislature
have been willing to set forth a clear method of reducing the difficul-
ties inherent in classification. The present reality in the law is that the
primary purpose of the doctrine, to shield governments from statutes
of limitations which would impede the discharge of core activities, is
being significantly compromised.
Two clear solutions exist to resolving the post-Rowan problems of
proper application of the governmental-versus-proprietary test for
application of a statute of limitation against a governmental entity:
modification or elimination. There are certainly costs and benefits to
each approach and it is unclear which of the approaches mentioned
would best serve the citizens of North Carolina. However, given North
Carolina's judicial history of interpretation of the dichotomous tests,
several things are clear and must be addressed by the courts.
First, while some aspects of the original doctrinal rationale are
outmoded, nullum tempus has a common law and constitutional
underpinning which robustly supports continued survival of the doc-
trine. Accordingly, continued justification based on the absolute
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perfection of the sovereign, misplaced in modern times, should be sup-
planted by the justification of state sovereignty.
Second, the nullum tempus doctrine is not and cannot be consist-
ently applied using existing precedent. Quite simply, the dichotomous
governmental-versus-proprietary test does not work.
Finally, modification of existing law is warranted to provide con-
sistency and even application of the law in this area. Changing public
policy to grant a strong presumption of a governmental purpose is one
way to achieve consistency. However, in the event no modification is
undertaken, serious consideration must be given to abrogating the
doctrine entirely in order to restore consistency to the judicial deci-
sion-making process one way or another.
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